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USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
CONTRACTS 2005 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In November 2008, the Attorney General’s Department released a consultation paper on the Australian 
Government’s proposal to accede to the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts (‘CUECIC’ or ‘Convention’).1  The consultation paper proposes 
certain amendments to existing Australian electronic transactions legislation, i.e. the Electronic 
Transactions Act (Commonwealth) 1999 (‘ETA’) and its state equivalents.2 The paper contains a number of 
recommendations designed to ‘update’ the ETA and ‘bring it into line’3 with the Convention. The primary 
aim of the latter is to enhance legal certainty and commercial predictability where electronic 
communications are used in relation to international contracts. Its purpose is to facilitate international 
trade by offering practical solutions for issues arising out of the use of electronic communications in the 
formation or performance of contracts between parties located in different countries. The Convention was 
formally adopted by the UN on 23 November 2005 and remained open for signature until 16 January 2008. 
The Australian Government, through the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, is presently debating 
whether to accede to the Convention.   
Translated into practice, the CUECIC governs transactions concluded over the Internet and what 
is commonly referred to as e-commerce, i.e. the ‘use of digital systems to create/perform commercial 
transactions.’4 The consultation paper suggests that the solutions of the CUECIC be cascaded down to the 
                                                
1 Convention on the use of Electronic Communications in International Contracting, adopted on 23rd November 2005.  
2 Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (NSW), Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000, Electronic Transactions Act 
2000 (SA), Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (Tas), Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (NT), Electronic Transactions 
Act 2001 (ACT), Electronic Transactions Act 2001 (Qld) containing slight variations, Electronic Transactions Act 
2003 (WA).  
3 Consultation Paper p 5 
4 R T Nimmer, H K Towle, Law of ElectronicCommercial Transactions, Arlington 2003,  para 1.01; see also: Guide to 
Measuring the Information Society, OECD Working Party on Indicators for the Information Society, DSTI/ICCP/IIS 
(2005) 6/Final, p 41, which introduces a distinction depending on whether the sale and purchase of goods and 
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individual state ETAs – irrespective of and apart from the adoption of the convention to international 
contracts.5 As a result, a number of legal solutions, which assume an international and strictly commercial 
(i.e. non-consumer) character of the transaction, would directly apply to domestic transactions conducted 
by electronic means.  
The consultation paper contains 11 recommendations. They range from meeting formal 
requirements on-line, determining a party’s place of business, through to formulating rules of establishing 
‘dispatch’ and ‘receipt’ of electronic communications. The present article discusses only 4 
recommendations, namely those relating to the mechanics of contract formation. It highlights the potential 
complications that may result from the amendment of the ETA and the interference those alleged 
‘updates’ may cause with the existing legal regime governing contract formation. Unavoidably, the 
arguments presented lead to a critique of some of the solutions adapted by the CUECIC and the ETA. 
 
ROADMAP 
This article commences with a number of caveats and observations, which delineate the scope of 
argument. To set the stage for a discussion of the proposed changes, the common assumptions underlying 
the CUECIC and the ETA are introduced. Subsequently, the basic contractual principles are recalled. These 
latter constitute the common denominator of all further discussions.  Next, the 4 recommendations 
affecting contract formation are presented. Their order of presentation is dictated by the argument – not 
their individual numbering. A common thread in three of the recommendations is the automation of 
electronic transactions. It exemplifies the state of confusion persisting with regard to the use of pre-
programmed information systems in the formation of contracts. The fourth recommendation touches on the 
subject of determining the time of formation. It is the latter recommendation that deserves special 
attention as it illustrates the difficulties in transposing traditional, ‘paper-based’ principles onto novel 
communication scenarios. The starting point for any discussion of the proposed changes must be an in-
depth look at the rules of determining the time of contract formation. These rules developed around 
methods of communication, which may no longer be in wide use, such as telexes and telegrams. It is also 
necessary to briefly mention the technological difficulties introduced by new communication methods. 
Descriptions of technology are, however, kept to a minimum. After all, even the most basic communication 
scenarios can illustrate the challenges of applying rules, which developed around the post, to electronic 
contracting scenarios. It must also be remembered that different technologies create different challenges. 
The two most popular Internet-based communication technologies, email and the world-wide-web, are 
taken as examples.  The latter forms the basis of the first three recommendations; the former seems to 
have more relevance for the discussion of ‘dispatch’ and ‘receipt.’ Needless to say, legal challenges do not 
fold neatly along technological lines and the suggested division is a necessary simplification. 
 
CAVEATS & GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
This article steers clear of questions of general policy and international law. It is also beyond its scope to 
analyze all proposed changes of the ETA. The discussion is limited to those provisions of the CUECIC and 
those recommendations that directly affect the formation of contracts by electronic means in Australia. 
The aim is modest: to show the complications that may arise if the ‘updates’ are implemented.  In 
particular, the creation of a separate legal regime for electronic transactions is exposed.  
                                                                                                                                          
services is conducted over computer-mediated networks or over the Internet; for different definitions and a 
discussion of basic business models see: J F Rayport, B J Jaworski, Introduction to E-commerce, New York 2002, pp 
4, 5; K C Laudon, C G Traver, E-commerce: Business, Technology, Society, Sydney 2001, p 57; the Australian Report of 
the Electronic Commerce Expert Group to the Attorney General (1998)  para 1.2, defines e-commerce as including 
facsimile and telephone. 
5 Consultation Paper p 5 
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This article focuses on four recommendations: 
• the use of automated systems for contract formation; 
• the use of electronic communications to make invitations to treat;  
• the right of withdrawal where a natural person makes an input error when dealing with an 
automated system; and 
• the formulation of ‘dispatch’ and ‘receipt’ when determining the time of contract formation. 
In accordance with the consultation paper the Convention contains ‘additional rules directed at 
clarifying traditional rules on contract formation to accommodate the needs of electronic commerce.’6 
Apart from those issues, it does not otherwise ‘purport to vary or create contract law.’7 The alleged 
‘clarifications,’ however, quite often depart from the original principles and introduce significant 
modifications thereto. In this sense, any claims regarding ‘clarifications’ are misleading and must be 
approached with caution. The consultation paper also frequently uses the term ‘update.’ Allegedly, the 
ETA needs to be brought into line with the developments in this rapidly changing area of law.8 As 
presented below, the solutions adopted by the ETA are by no means perfect and leave room for 
improvement. Some of the ETA’s provisions would benefit from a ‘clarification.’ In this sense an ‘update’ is 
desirable. It can be doubted, however, whether the suggested CUECIC solutions constitute an 
improvement or clarify anything. The CUECIC is newer – but not necessarily better. It can also be 
questioned whether the discussed area of law is ‘changing rapidly.’ Quite the opposite seems to be the 
case: after an initial flurry of activity in the 90’s, it has become apparent that changes in communication 
technologies need not be necessarily accompanied by revolutionary changes to the law – at least not 
when it comes to contract law. In sum, one could question the necessity of ‘updating’ as well as the 
quality of the update itself. 
Two further observations are required. First, the Attorney General suggests amending the ETA to 
reflect the solutions in the CUECIC to avoid creating a duality of regimes: one for domestic electronic 
transactions and another for international electronic transactions.9 The side effect of this approach is the 
creation of a duality of regimes within Australian contract law itself: one for contracts formed by 
traditional means and one for contracts formed by electronic means. This is so despite frequent 
declarations to the contrary. Both the explanatory notes to the CUECIC and the Consultation Paper 
emphasize the need to avoid creating a parallel regime.10  
Second, the regulatory effort seems outdated. Doubts about the legal viability of electronic 
transactions might have existed in 1995, when the National Science Foundation removed the prohibition to 
use the Internet for commercial traffic and networked transactions became a mainstream phenomenon.11 It 
is questionable whether any doubts exist in 2008, when the volume of on-line retail transactions is 
counted in hundreds of billions. One might even question whether the ETA retains its original raison d’etre. 
After all, e-commerce thrived despite the alleged ‘obstacles’ to its development. It is therefore 
questionable whether – from a contract law perspective – there is a need for any further clarifications.   
 
                                                
6 Consultation Paper p 12 
7 Consultation Paper p 12 
8 Consultation Paper p 5 
9 Consultation Paper p 5 
10 Consultation Paper p 29, CUECIC Explanatory Note para [113] p 43 
11 K C Laudon, C G Traver, E-Commerce: Business, Technology, Society, Sydney 2001, p 113, 114 
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BACKGROUND 
Both the ETA and the Convention are based on the 1996 Model Law on Electronic Commerce (‘MLEC’).12 
The latter provides a template for national legislatures and serves as a guide for drafting contracts in the 
area of electronic commerce. Its solutions exemplify early attempts to resolve legal uncertainties 
pertaining to electronic transactions. The MLEC applies to commercial actors only. Both the ETA and the 
Convention, however, diverge from the original wording of the MLEC – the ETA by changing some of the 
mechanisms prescribed by the model law, the Convention by changing and adding certain important 
provisions.  
The CUECIC combines most of the MLEC’s wording with some of the approaches adopted by the 
UNCITRAL Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), especially in terms of scope 
of application, principles of statutory interpretation and declarations of variations by the ratifying 
countries.13 While the MLEC seems to be the common denominator of both the ETA and the CUECIC, the 
latter tilts towards some of the solutions adopted by the CISG. Unlike the MLEC and the Convention, which 
apply to commercial actors only, the ETA also applies to consumers and to dealings with the government. 
The exact scope of its application depends on the definition of ‘laws of the commonwealth,’ i.e. whether it 
is limited to the laws passed by the Commonwealth or includes common law and the rules of equity.14 
All of the above regulations aim to facilitate on-line commerce and remove ‘obstacles’ to the 
validity and enforceability of on-line contracts by (a) providing that electronic contracts are equally valid as 
‘traditional’ contracts, and (b) establishing criteria for the fulfillment of the requirements of ‘writing,’ 
‘signatures’ and ‘originals’ in electronic form.15 Their guiding principle is that any discrimination on the 
sole basis that a contract originated in electronic form is prohibited.16 It could be claimed that some of the 
problems they are trying to address are non-existent17 and that provisions that contracts can be formed 
electronically merely state the obvious.18 After all, the electronic form does not pose an obstacle to valid 
and enforceable on-line transactions as the substantive rules of contract law permit intention to be 
manifested in any manner.19 There being no general requirement for contracts to be in writing or to be 
signed, formal requirements are an exception not the rule.20 The more so, that most transactions that are 
accompanied by formalities are specifically excluded form the scope of the regulations.21 To repeat the 
point: the absence of traditional ‘writing’ and ‘signatures’ does not threaten the validity or enforceability 
of contracts or pose an obstacle to their formation on-line. A simple prohibition to discriminate on the 
basis of ‘electronic’ form would have sufficed to appease those uncomfortable with transactions 
concluded by electronic means. Anything beyond that seems an unnecessary repetition of the obvious. The 
aim of this article, however, is not to discuss contract formalities but contract formation. 
                                                
12 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment (1996) with additional article 5 bis as 
adopted in 1998, developed by the UN Commission on International Trade Law.   
13 For a detailed description of the procedural and international aspects of CUECIC see: Ch H Martin, The UNCITRAL 
Electronic Contracts Convention: Will it be Used or Avoided? (2005) 17 Pace Int’l L Rev 261  
14 S Christensen, Formation of Contracts by Email – Is it Just the Same as the Post? (2001) 1 QUTLJ 22 at 24, citing R 
v Kidman (1915) 20 CLR 425 and Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552 at 559 per Young CJ; P Knight, The Electronic 
Transactions Bill 1999 (2000) 6 CTLR 105 at 105; Electronic Transactions Bill 1999, Explanatory Memorandum, p 21 
15 the objectives and scope of the MLEC are described in detail in the ‘Introduction’ to the Guide to Enactment, paras 
2-21. 
16 MLEC Art 5; CUECIC Art 8; ETA Section 8 
17 J Braucher, Rent-Seeking in the New Statutory Law of Electronic Commerce: Difficulties in Moving Consumer 
Protection Online (2001) Wis L Rev 527 at 527 
18 A DeZilva, Electronic Transactions Legislation: An Australian Perspective (2003) 37 Int’l Law 1009 at 1012 
19 Carter on Contract [02-060] 
20 Carter on Contract [01-001] 
21 CUECIC Explanatory Note para [7] p 14 
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A RECOUNT OF BASICS 
As a point of departure, it is worthwhile recalling some substantive principles of contract law. The latter 
tend to be forgotten or distorted whenever transactions are concluded by means of emails and websites. 
The importance of ‘classic’ contract law cannot be overstated. After all, ‘[a]lmost every question posed by 
business dealings in cyberspace can be reduced to a question involving contract law.’22   
It is a common misconception that electronic transactions are somehow different and that the 
traditional principles of contract law do not apply in ‘cyberspace.’ This misconception is best illustrated by 
theories aiming at modifying the analytical approach based on ‘offer and acceptance.’23 Throughout the 
discussion it must be remembered that despite the differences in how statements are exchanged, the 
ground rules remain the same: intention, consideration, as well as certainty and completeness, are 
required for contracts formed electronically and for contracts formed by traditional means. In electronic 
transactions consideration may take an unusual form, such as the permission to study one’s browsing 
behavior. Certainty and completeness may be difficult to discern from multiple interactive screens 
connected by hyperlinks. Both on-line and in the real world, however, the intention of the parties remains 
paramount.24 Intention is attenuated by the objective theory of contract25 and based on an assessment of 
what the parties said or did.26 A common way of evaluating intention is by means of the offer and 
acceptance model.27 Whether a particular communication is an offer or an acceptance is determined on 
the basis of the rules governing the construction of communications. The labels of ‘offer’ and ‘acceptance’ 
are placed on specific words, documents or conduct to determine the existence of agreement, the moment 
of formation and the contents of the contract.28 Those rules apply regardless of whether a statement is 
expressed by means of written documents, websites or email messages.  
 
THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF AUTOMATION 
Recommendation 6 states:  
a) The ETAs should incorporate a provision to clarify the validity of contracts resulting from the 
use of automated message systems, and  
b) The ETAs should incorporate a definition of ‘automated message system’ meaning ‘a computer 
program or an electronic or other automated means used to initiate an action or respond to data 
messages or performances in whole or in part, without review or intervention by a natural person 
each time an action is initiated or a response is generated by the system.’  
The above recommendation implies that the validity of contracts formed by automated means can be 
questioned. The alleged problem of ‘automated contracting’ – usually couched in the term ‘electronic 
agent’ - has been the subject of multiple articles published in the 90’s, i.e. during the initial fascination 
                                                
22 E A Cavazos, G Morin, Cyberspace and the Law: Your Rights and Duties in the On-line World, Cambridge 1994, p 34 
23 See e.g. M P Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot andFurmston’s Law of Contract, 14th ed, London 2001:’[A] new contract 
formation rule may emerge for electronic transactions – the ‘last act’ rule whereby the last act is equivalent to 
acceptance.’ [3.44] See also the preparatory works of the UNCITRAL Working Group IV on Electronic Commerce, 
which lead to the adoption of the CUECIC. It was debated whether electronic contracting requires the developments 
of new rules or whether the rules applied to traditional contracts can respond to the needs of novel communication 
techniques. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.91 
24 Paal Wilson & Co A/S v Partenreederei Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1 AC 854 at 917 
25 Carter on Contract [01-090]; M P Furmston ed, The Law of Contract, London 1999; para 2.8 
26 Carter on Contract [02-040]; see also: J M Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and 
Interpretation (2000) 69 Fordham L Rev 427; as per Lord Diplock in Paal Wilson & Co A/S v Partenreederei Hannah 
Blumenthal [1983] 1 AC 854  at 915 
27 Carter, Peden &Tolhurst [3-02] p 37 
28 R Craswell, Offer, Acceptance and Efficient Reliance (1996) 48 Stan L Rev 481 at 482; New Zealand Shipping Co 
Ltd v A M Satterwaite & Co Ltd, The Eurymedon [1975] AC 154 
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with e-commerce and the theoretical turmoil that accompanied it.29 It is somewhat surprising, however, 
that automation could be regarded as an ‘uncertainty’ in 2008.   
E-commerce is based on automated mass-market transactions.30 Goods are ordered by means of 
email messages, order forms and virtual shopping carts.31 Customers browse through menus and select 
products by clicking their images or descriptions.32 After providing shipping and payment data, websites 
calculate the price and shipping costs. Finally, confirmations presenting the items ordered and the total 
price are displayed or sent to the relevant email accounts. The described interactions are not the result of 
back-offices with hundreds of employees answering emails, checking the contents of virtual shopping 
carts and order forms. Websites are interfaces to complex, multi-tiered systems consisting of servers, 
networking equipment and databases.33 Accordingly, websites epitomize automation. They also fit 
perfectly under the definition of ‘automated message system’ provided by the CUECIC.34   
The consultation paper emphasizes that the lack of human intervention should not preclude valid 
contract formation.35 Similarly, UNCITRAL’s explanatory note elaborates that the critical element in the 
concept of automation is the ‘lack of human actor on one or both sides of the transaction.’36 It is, however, 
a logical shortcut to imply that there is no ‘human involvement.’ Websites do not ‘self-initiate.’ There is a 
human person who sets up, controls, operates a website.37 Technological complexity aside, automation 
does not change the fact that it is the human user who creates and controls the website.38 The latter is 
nothing but a ‘booking clerk in disguise.’39 It is pre-programmed and executes a set of instructions given by 
a human person.  
Leaving aside the alleged ‘lack’ of human involvement, the necessity to validate automated 
transactions can be questioned on another ground.  Contractual intention can be manifested in any manner 
– including that of placing an HTML file on a web-server for general access.40 Anticipating arguments that 
there is no human intention at the moment of contract formation, it must be emphasized that the minds of 
the parties need not meet in perfect simultaneity.41 Accordingly, intention persists as long as the website 
is held out. Despite the absence of direct human involvement at the time of formation, intention can be 
                                                
29 see e.g: T Allen, R Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts? (1996) 9 Harv J Law & Tech 25 (‘Allen & Widdison’); 
Ch C Nicoll, Can Computers Make Contracts (1998) JBL 34; L E Wein, The Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts: 
Towards and Automation Jurisprudence (1992) 6 Harv J Law & Tech 103, see also J H Sommer, Against Cyberlaw 
(2000) 15 Berkeley Tech L J 1145 at 1178 
30 W Ford, M S Baum, Secure Electronic Commerce, Building the Infrastructure for Digital Signatures and Encryption, 
2nd ed, New Jersey, 2001  p 30 
31 W A Effross, The Legal Architecture of Virtual Stores: World Wide Web Sites and the Uniform Commercial Code 
(1997) 34 San Diego L Rev 1263 
32 P Loshin, J Vacca, P Murphy, Electronic Commerce, On-line Ordering and Digital Money, Hingham 2001, p 397 
33 For a more detailed description of e-commerce architectures see: G P Schneider, J T Perry, Electronic Commerce, 
Cambridge 2001, p 64, 65 
34 See definition in CUECIC Art 4: ‘a computer program or an electronic or other automated means used to initiate an 
action or respond to data messages or performances in whole or in part, without review or intervention by a natural 
person each time an action is initiated or a response is generated by the system.’  
35 Consultation Paper p 23, point 3.8 
36 CUECIC Explanatory Note para [104], p 40 
37 J-F Lerouge, Symposium: UCITA: The Use of Electronic Agents Questioned Under Contractual Law: Suggested 
Solutions on a European and American Level (1999) 18 J Marshall J Computer & Info 403 at 405 
38 T Allen, R. Widdison above at note 30 at 46 
39 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163 at 169 
40 At a basic level, each website is the product of a file written in the hypertext mark-up language, or HTML, which is 
hosted on a webserver.  
41 Kennedy v Lee (1817) [citation]; 36 Eng RepER 170 (Ch 1817); J M Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of 
Contract Formation and Interpretation (2000YEAR) 69 Fordham L Rev 427 at 439, 440 
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traced back to an earlier moment.42 Websites do not make their ‘own’ decisions, but execute earlier human 
decisions within the limits of pre-set parameters.43 
Automation comports with the objective evaluation of contractual intention and with the 
possibility to express such intention in any manner. There is no need to confirm the admissibility of 
contracting via automated means, just as there was no need to confirm and regulate contracts concluded 
with the help of vending machines. The latter could raise the exact same set of theoretical objections as 
websites. To ‘regulate’ or ‘validate’ automated transactions is to imply that there is a problem where none 
exists. Accordingly, the current ETA can be praised for not introducing any provisions ‘validating’ 
automation. Automated contract formation is admissible on the basis of general principles – without the 
need for further clarifications or confirmations.  
 
‘ELECTRONIC MISTAKES’ 
Recommendation 7 states: 
a) The ETAs should incorporate article 14 of the Convention offering the right to withdraw the 
portion of the electronic communication in which an input error was made if the automated 
message system does not provide the person making the input, or the party on whose behalf that 
person was acting, with an opportunity to correct the error, […] 
The problem of ‘input errors’ continues the thread of ‘automation.’ While the possibility to use automated 
systems for contract formation need not be confirmed, it must be admitted that automation may create 
problems for the person dealing with the automated system, for example, the person who visits an e-
commerce website.  This scenario addresses another aspect of automation: one party sets up a website, 
i.e. uses an automated system, the other party interacts with this system. The article aims at protecting 
the latter, while “errors” or “malfunctions” from the side of the electronic agent seem to be dealt with 
indirectly by recommendation 5 (see below). The proposed mechanism constitutes a subtle modification of 
the contract formation procedure. Its evaluation must be approached from two angles: practical and 
theoretical.  
From a practical perspective, the solution must be applauded. It implicitly recognizes the 
perceptual difficulties that might be created when communicating via a website. Accordingly, it is not 
automation per se that is the source of potential difficulties. It is the fact that the person who sets up a 
website prescribes the manner in which the other party manifests his or her intention. The person 
transacting ‘with’ a website can only follow the options permitted by the interface, i.e. the graphical 
layout of icons and links. The manner of expression is limited. Unlike in the case of a simple touch-screen 
ATM or ticket machine, there is more potential for confusion: more options to be selected and more 
‘mistakes’ to be made.44 In practice, Art 14 encourages the inclusion of so-called ‘confirmation screens,’ 
which effectively ask ‘is this what you mean?’  and provide an opportunity to correct errors from the side 
of the website visitor.45 
                                                
42 M P Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 14th ed, London 2001,  p 29; Carter on Contract 
[01-090] 
43 R Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Legal Issues (1996) 14 J Marshall J Computer & Info L 211 at 212; R Nimmer, 
Contract Law in Electronic Commerce (2000) 587 PLI/Pat 1127; see also UETA section 14 and comment 1 thereto: 
‘When machines are involved, the requisite intention flows from the programming and the use of the machine.’ A 
similar view was expressed by A Liegl, P Brautigam, A Leupold, in: Law of International On-Line Business, A 
Global Perspective, London 1998, p 394 
44 CUECIC Explanatory Note para [225] p 73 
45 see also European Directive on Electronic Commerce Art 10.1 (c), which provides for a similar mechanism ‘prior to 
the order being placed’ by the consumer. 
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The solution appears slightly more complicated when approached from a theoretical perspective. 
Traditionally, parties are bound by their manifested intention and are not given the opportunity to retract 
previously made statements. Their motives to enter into a particular contract are irrelevant.46 Only in very 
limited circumstances, for example, when an element of inducement or knowledge of the mistake is 
present, 47 can a mistaken belief of one party bear legal consequences.  Both the Consultation Paper and 
the explanatory notes state that Art.14 is not intended to interfere with or alter the rules of mistake, 
especially regarding its consequences. Despite the intuitive association of ‘input errors’ with ‘mistake,’ the 
former do not easily fit under any of the popular scenarios relating to contractual mistake.   After all, the 
suggested mechanism is designed to prevent mistakes, i.e. a discrepancy between real and expressed 
intention. If an opportunity to correct errors is provided, the right of withdrawal does not exist and any 
‘errors’ are governed by traditional principles.48 
Short of situations where a website is intentionally designed to confuse customers, it may be 
difficult to accuse its operator of inducement or misrepresentation. It may be equally difficult to suspect 
that the operator should have known that the expressed intention of the customer does not correspond 
with his or her real intention.49 No matter how good the design of the user interface, there will always be 
individuals prone to ‘accidentally’ clicking an icon or selecting the incorrect option form the drop-down 
menu. It must be admitted, however, that in certain circumstances the website vendor should know that 
the customer’s request cannot be correct. To illustrate the point: while shopping for clothes, the customer 
selects 222 shirts. An order for 2 shirts is normal, 22 may raise some eyebrows but 222 is an obvious error 
– at least on a retail website. This must be contrasted with situations where the customer selects the 
incorrect color or size of a shirt. In the latter scenario, the element of implied knowledge of the mistake is 
absent. The latter scenario also illustrates the potential for abuse on the side of the website customer: 
absent an opportunity to correct he or she may still withdraw the relevant portion of its statement – not 
because he made an error but because he changed his mind. With regard to the first scenario, it must be 
noted that even absent a confirmation screen, the input error will become apparent to the customer once 
payment information must be provided. Whenever payment is required, the practical necessity of 
confirmation screens may therefore be limited. 
It is unclear, why Art.14 endorsed the ‘right to withdraw’ the relevant portion of the statement, 
instead of opting for the ‘right to correct’ the original statement. One would have assumed that the 
provision of an opportunity to correct errors by the website operator, would be mirrored by a right to 
correct errors on the side of the visitor.  In practice, the partial withdrawal of a statement may deprive it of 
the necessary certainty and completeness thereby effectively giving the party ‘in error’ a right to prevent 
the contract from coming into being. The ‘right to correct’ appears more suitable to uphold the transaction 
– despite the initial error. The ‘right to withdraw’ translates into a rescission of the contract on the basis 
of a technicality and may open the door to abuses.  
  
AN UNNECESSARY PRESUMPTION  
Recommendation 5 states: 
The ETAs should incorporate a provision that proposals to enter into a contract made by 
electronic means to the world at large are to be treated as an invitation to make offers, unless 
there is a clear indication by the trader of an intention to be bound. 
The recommendation is based on CUECIC Art. 11, which establishes a presumption that websites are 
invitations. 50 The purpose of the suggested amendment is described as a clarification of the extent ‘to 
                                                
46 Carter, Peden & Tolhurst [20-06] 
47 Hartog v Colin & Shields [1939] 3 All  ER 566; Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422 
48  CUECIC Explanatory Note para [233] p 75 
49 Carter, Peden & Tolhurst [20-13], see also CUECIC Explanatory Note para [227] p 74 
50 CUECIC Article 11 reads:  
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which parties offering goods or services through open, generally accessible communication systems, such 
as a website, are bound by advertisements made this way.’51 This statement relies on the fallacy that all 
websites are advertisements. It also exemplifies an attempt to modify traditional principles while 
disguising it as a ‘clarification.’  
Offers indicate a willingness to enter into a contract without further negotiations. They bind the 
offeror and can be accepted by a simple ‘yes.’52 Offers are distinguished from invitations to treat 
(‘invitations’), which are non-binding indications of a general willingness to contract.53 The distinction 
depends exclusively on the intention of the maker of the statement and is inferred from the words in the 
context in which they are used. Offers can be accepted by a single act of acquiescence because they 
contain all the contents of the contract, i.e. they are certain and complete. 54 Invitations lack the required 
completeness and can be regarded as requests to submit offers. Being non-binding by nature, they give 
the maker of the statement the ultimate choice whether to contract or not.55 
Invitations also shield the maker of the statement from the risk of ‘over-acceptance,’ i.e. the 
inability to perform when the number of acceptances exceeds the number of items on stock.56 Accordingly, 
designing one’s market appearance as an invitation serves protective purposes. The ‘protective’ function 
of invitations was also highlighted in the consultation paper.57 It can be assumed that this emphasis 
derives from a number of cases where a website displayed incorrect pricing information and the vendor 
was obliged to sell its goods at the incorrect, heavily discounted price. In this sense, the proposed 
provision seems to be a protective mechanism against computer errors, which are another side effect of 
automation. As one author commented on e-commerce: ‘the speed with which a retailer can lose several 
million pounds can be matched in no other retail medium.’58 Examples abound: in its on-line shop, Argos 
offered television sets on sale for £ 2.99 instead of 299.99;59 Eastman Kodak advertised a digital camera 
on their UK website at £ 100 rather than £ 329;60 Digilandmall.com offered professional printers for 66 S$ 
instead of S$ 3000.61  
CUECIC Art 11 states a default rule that manifestations of intention in the form of websites are 
not binding. It is, however, impossible to mechanically subsume all websites under either category on the 
mere ground that they are websites.62 Such attempts were already made during the preparatory works for 
the CUECIC. Websites should be regarded as invitations because they are ‘like advertisements’ and they 
                                                                                                                                          
‘A proposal to conclude a contract made through one or more electronic communications which is not 
addressed to one or more specific parties, but is generally accessible to parties making use of information 
systems, including proposals that make use of interactive applications for the placement of orders through 
such information systems, is to be considered as an invitation to make offers, unless it clearly indicates the 
intention of the party making the proposal to be bound in case of acceptance.’ 
51 Consultation Paper p 21, point 3.3 
52 Carter on Contract [03-001] 
53 M P Furmston ed, The Law of Contract, London 1999 para 2.193 
54 May and Butcher Ltd v R [1934] 2 KB 17n 
55 Esso Petroleum Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1976] 1 WLR 1 at 11 
56 Grainger & Son v Gough (Surveyor of Taxes) [1896] AC 325 at 334; Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421; 
proposal likely to be considered an invitation, if it does not limit quantity, see: Kelly v Caledonian Coal Co (1898) 19 
LR (NSW) 1 
57 Consultation Paper p 22, CUECIC explanatory note [204], p. 67 
58 Ph Rees, R Calleja; News Update – E-commerce – Offers you can’t refuse, (2002) 3 IJECL & P Ecom 1.4 at 1 
59 D Thompson, Contracting over the Internet – Argos’s Failure to honour Internet Orders (2000) 53 IJECL & P Ecom 
1.1 at 1 
60 Ph Rees, R Calleja, above at note 59 at 1 
61 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] SGHC 71 
62 Squires, Some Contract Issues Arising from Online Business-Consumer Agreements (2000) 5 Deakin LR 95 at 104; 
see also Treitel p 12, who states that where a supplier indicates the availability of goods or services on a website, 
‘the offer would seem to come from the customer (e.g. when he clicks the appropriate ‘button’) and it is open to the 
supplier to accept or reject that offer.’ Chissick & Kelman p 75 
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are addressed to the world at large.63 It was also observed that: ‘[i]nternet transactions may not easily fit 
into the established distinctions between what might constitute an ‘offer’ and what should be interpreted 
as an ‘invitation to treat.’64 This statement illustrates a common misunderstanding. 
First, to claim that Internet transactions do not easily fit the traditional analytical model implies 
that real-world transactions do. This is obviously not the case. Most difficulties in transposing the offer 
and acceptance analysis to novel transacting scenarios result from the fact that it is a model. Applying 
models against real-life situations is inherently difficult. The difficulties are more pronounced in the case 
of on-line transactions because manifestations of intention often take an unusual form.  
Second, the ‘distinctions’ between offers and invitations are by no means ‘established.’ The 
treatment of certain stereotyped situations as indications of final intention is inconsistent and does not 
provide universal rules. Although the interpretation of certain kinds of expressions appears standardized,65 
care must be taken not to generalize.  
Third, it appears contrary to the spirit of practically all model regulations to introduce media- (or 
technology-) specific rules. After all, both the CUECIC66 and ETA67 build on the concept of media neutrality 
and abound with declarations to this effect.68 The creation of a presumption in relation to websites 
contradicts this very concept. Why should a statement made on a website be interpreted any differently 
than the same statement made in a newspaper or verbally? It is the content of a statement, not the 
method of its communication that must be analyzed to determine its legal effect. Websites are subject to 
the same rules of construction like any other manifestations of intention. The fact that a statement is 
posted on a website must not automatically prejudice the outcome of the analysis. A website must be 
approached like any other manifestation of intention.69  
The Convention also proposes criteria that determine whether a website is an invitation or an 
offer: interactivity and number of addressees.70 From a theoretical perspective, however, neither criterion 
is admissible. The binding character of a website cannot depend on the degree of interactivity.71 The 
presence of an interactive interface does not imply that the terms are certain and complete. While 
‘passive’ websites require additional steps to contact the merchant and may not enable the formation of 
the contract on-line, they may be construed as an offer if a contract can be formed exclusively on the basis 
of their contents. The absence of interactivity does not imply that the website’s contents are not 
sufficiently certain and complete to be binding. Similarly, the legal character of a website cannot depend 
on the number of addressees. If an offer is made to the public at large the offeror becomes liable to the 
person who accepts, not to everyone.72 It is trite law that the unlimited number of addressees does not 
preclude a statement from being binding.73 
                                                
63 See: A/CN.9/WB.IV/ WP.91 paras 47, 48; A/CN.9/484 para 125 
64 A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.95 para 53 
65 M A Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance (1994) 82 Cal L Rev 1127 
at 1129 
66 CUECIC Explanatory Note [48], p 26 
67 see Consultation Paper p 21, point 3.2,  
68 See CUECIC Explanatory Note para [199] p 65: in keeping with the principle of media neutrality, on-line 
transactions should not be different from the solution in a paper-based environment. 
69 L Wilmot, S Christensen, D Butler, Contract Law, 2nd ed, Melbourne 2005  [3.4] [3.130] 
70 A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.91 par 47 
71 The ‘non-interactive’/’interactive’ division is also mentioned in the CUECIC preparatory works. See: 
A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.95 para 54. It was stated that websites containing interactive applications enable the 
immediate conclusion of a contract and may therefore be regarded as offers. It was not explained why the 
possibility to conclude a contract should predetermine the legal character of websites.  
72 Carter on Contract [03-020]; Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256 at 268 
73 Carter, Peden & Tolhurst [3-08] p 42 
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One must also be carful when drawing wholesale comparisons of websites to other expressions 
of intention.  Websites can be likened to virtual shop displays, mail-order catalogues, traditional 
advertising in mass media, which are routinely regarded as invitations.74 Both advertisements and shop 
displays, however, may constitute offers if they are sufficiently certain to allow the inference of 
intention.75 The fact that a website resembles an advertisement does not automatically preclude it from 
being binding. Websites can also be compared to vending machines, which are generally regarded as 
offers.76 An intention to be bound is expressed by making the vending machine publicly available and 
delivering the product or service to anyone who inserts the required coin.77 The resemblance to vending 
machines is particularly strong, whenever the delivery of a digital ‘product’ or service occurs directly on 
the website.78 Whoever provides payment information or ‘clicks’ the appropriate button is provided with 
the service, be it remaining on the website, downloading software or obtaining another benefit. Provided 
the contents are certain and complete, the intention to be bound derives from the immediate ability to 
execute the transaction.79 
Last but not least, the protective function of invitations is not necessarily required in e-commerce 
transactions as the risk of over-exposure can be prevented by technological means. Applications can be 
programmed not to accept orders of goods low on stock and dynamically change product information to 
reflect the number of items available. With digital products, such as the contents of the websites, the risk 
of over-acceptance is often absent altogether. The owner of a website can also protect him- or herself by 
explicitly stating that the website does not constitute an offer. A simple disclaimer may therefore be as 
effective as technological measures. 
In sum, the introduction of a presumption unnecessarily prejudices the analysis and constitutes 
an alteration of well-established rules. The question is not whether websites are binding or whether they 
resemble other forms of expression, such as advertisements or vending machines. The question is whether 
the maker of a statement intended it to be binding. 
 
THE TIME OF CONTRACT FORMATION 
Recommendation 9 states: 
(a) The default rules in the ETAs for timing of dispatch be amended so that:  
(i) the ETA’s formula for determining time of dispatch (‘when it enters an information 
system outside the control of the originator’) reflect instead the Convention’s 
formula (‘when it leaves an information system under the control of the originator’) 
[…] 
(b) The default rules in the ETAs for timing of receipt should be amended so that: 
(i) the time of receipt of an electronic communication is the time when it becomes 
capable of being retrieved by the addressee at an electronic address designated by 
the addressee (an electronic communication is presumed to be capable of being 
retrieved by the addressee when it reaches the addressee’s electronic address), and 
                                                
74 M P Furmston ed, The Law of Contract, London 1999  para 2.196 
75 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256 at 262, see also Lefkowitz v Great Minneapolis Surplus Store 86 
NW 2d 689 (Minn 1957); Lexmead (Basingstoke) Ltd v Lewis [1982] AC 225; see also M A Eisenberg, above at note 
45 at 1167, 1168, who criticizes the counter-intuitive nature of the construction rule that shop displays are 
invitations, as such rule cannot be based on the understanding of the reasonable addressee. 
76 The Law of Contract par 2.199; Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163 
77 P S Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract, Oxford 1995  p 58 
78 A Endeshaw, Web Services and the Law: A Sketch of the Potential Issues (2003) 11 IJT & IT 251  
79 M P Furmston above at note 74  para 2.198 
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(ii) the time of receipt of an electronic communication at another electronic address of 
the addressee is the time when it becomes capable of being retrieved by the 
addressee at that address and the addressee becomes aware that the electronic 
communication has been sent to that address. […]  
Based on the offer and acceptance model, a contract is formed when an acceptance becomes effective.80 
In principle, effectiveness is tied to the receipt of a message containing the acceptance, whereas the 
exception – popularly known as the ‘postal acceptance rule’ – associates effectiveness with the moment 
of dispatch. Accordingly, ‘receipt’ is the main component of the principle, ‘dispatch’ - of the exception. 
Formulating the moment of ‘receipt’ or ‘dispatch’ must be distinguished from determining whether 
acceptances communicated by electronic means become effective on receipt or on dispatch. The latter 
question remains unresolved by both the ETA and the CUECIC.81  
To date, neither ‘dispatch’ nor ‘receipt’ was analysed in terms of accessibility, legibility or ability 
to process. There was also no need to dissect the individual components of the communication 
infrastructure. Such analyses are required once contracts are formed by electronic means. In this sense, a 
clarification as to how to apply traditional principles in electronic transactions would be welcomed. As will 
be demonstrated, it seems doubtful whether the proposed solutions provide the desired clarification.  
The formulation of ‘dispatch’ and ‘receipt’ raises two sets of problems. First, electronic 
communications are characterized by risks, which have no counterparts in traditional communications. 
Messages are not only transmitted but also processed. Each time processing occurs there is a risk that the 
contents of the message are interfered with and/or rendered illegible. There is also a higher risk of the 
message not reaching its intended recipient altogether. Accordingly, apart from establishing the precise 
time of contract formation, ‘dispatch’ and ‘receipt’ serve as tools of risk allocation. Second, due to the 
complexity of communication systems and multiplicity of terminating devices, it becomes more difficult to 
select the particular point where dispatch or receipt is deemed to occur. 
When attempting to formulate the principles of ‘dispatch’ and ‘receipt,’ the implications of the 
terminology must be fully understood. There may be significant differences in the time of formation 
depending on whether a message ‘reaches,’ ‘enters’ or ‘becomes available.’ It is not only the network 
element or device that must be selected but also the verb, which describes the relationship between the 
message and the given element. The existence of the contract may hinge on the selection and/or 
construction of a single word. 
 
THE TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES 
Dispatch is generally associated with ‘posting’: placing a letter in a letterbox of the postal service or 
handing it to a postal employee. 82  Upon posting, the offeree loses control and is not responsible for 
‘accidents happening at the post office.’83 Postal communications involve at least two post offices and two 
mailboxes, the sender’s and the addressee’s. All these ‘components’ form one system, no distinction is 
made between the delivery of a letter to the post office or its placement in a mailbox in the street.84 
Accordingly, when an acceptance is effective on dispatch, addressees bear the risk of all accidents during 
the time letters remain in the sender’s mailbox, as well as during their subsequent transfer to the sender’s 
post office. Even if a letter is lost during these initial stages, acceptance is effective and a contract is 
formed. When the receipt rule applies, letters are received when they come into the addressee’s 
                                                
80 Carter, Peden & Tolhurst [3-26] p 58 
81 EN [130] p 47; H D Gabriel, The Fear of the Unknown: The Need to Provide Special Procedural Protections in 
International Electronic Commerce (2004) 50 Loy L Rev 307 at 328;  see also; Carter on Contract [03-430] on the lack 
of substantive rules regarding contract formation in the ETA  
82 Carter on Contract [03-350]  
83 Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 at 219  
84 Corbin on Contracts, vol 1 (1993) para 3.2 
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possession, or when they are deposited in a place held out for that type of communications.85 It is not 
necessary that the letter be read or even opened.  
Insight into the “traditional” rules governing dispatch and receipt can also be gained by analyzing 
communications via telex and telegram. Although neither is in wide use today, both telex and telegram 
illustrate the intricacies of establishing the precise time of contract formation when additional factors – 
such as intermediating machines – are included in the discussion. Although not strictly “electronic”, they 
can also be regarded as examples of communication methods where the message is transmitted in 
paperless form, by means of electric impulses.  In the case of telegrams, dispatch occurs at the telegraph 
office where the machine is located.86 It is not clear whether the message must leave the machine or 
whether typing the message ‘into’ the machine suffices. Unlike telegrams, telexes can be received directly 
in the office.87 In the landmark cases Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation88 and Brinkibon v Stahag und 
Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH,89 the contracting parties operated their own telex machines.90 No 
additional steps to send or access messages were necessary and there was no dependence on 
intermediaries. In Leach Nominees Pty Ltd v Walter Wright Pty Ltd91 the telex machine used by the sender 
was operated by third parties.  Acceptance was considered dispatched when the sender committed the 
message to a public telex operator, not when the message was sent from the telex machine.  
Receipt is generally associated with the arrival of a message at the addressee’s machine.92 After 
business hours, may be deemed to take place only once the office is re-opened on the following business 
day.93 The law deems certain occurrences as constituting receipt, presumably because they enable 
communication in the normal course of events. For receipt to occur, the addressee’s terminating device 
need not be attended or maintained in working order. If the terminating device malfunctions due to the 
addressee’s fault, the latter is deemed to have received the message or estopped from denying receipt. 94 
Although technically the message is never received, a contract is formed. If, however, a communication 
failure is not the fault of the addressee, there is no receipt and therefore no contract.95   
Existing principles relating to dispatch and receipt developed around simple communication 
scenarios. The ETA and the CUECIC attempt to transpose those principles onto a novel communication 
infrastructure and to electronically replicate the tests used for dispatch and receipt in paper-based 
communications.96 This ‘transposition,’ however, is done without factoring in of a number of complicating 
factors.  
 
                                                
85 See: CISG Art 24, which states that a message is received when it is delivered to the offeror personally, to the 
offeror’s place of business or mailing address, or to the offeror’s habitual residence. P Fasciano, above at note 11 
at 997 
86 Henkel v Pape (1870) LR 6 Exch 7; Bruner v Moore [1904] 1 Ch 305; Cowan v O’Conner (1888) 20 QBD 640 at 642; 
Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 38 
87 J D Gregory, Receiving Electronic Messages: Eastern Power v  Azienda Communale Energia & Ambiente (1999-
2000) 15 BFLR 473 at 480 
88 [1955] 2 QB 327 
89 [1983] 2 AC 34 
90 In both instances, the interactions were taking place between principals who operated their own telex machines, 
Brinkibon v Stahag und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34 at 42 
91 (1986) 85 FLR 427 at 434  
92 Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v Owners of the Motor Vessel ‘Brinmes’ (The Brinmes) (1974) 3 All ER 88 at 93 
93 Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v Owners of the Motor Vessel ‘Brinmes’ (The Brinmes) (1974) 3 All ER 88; Schelde Delta 
Shipping BV v Astarte Shipping Ltd (The ‘Pamela’) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 249 
94 Carter on Contract [03-410] 
95 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 at 333 
96 A/CN.9/528 para 149 
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TERMINATING AND ORIGINATING DEVICES 
When communicating over the phone, fax or telex there is only one machine on each side of the 
communication channel. Only the originating and the terminating devices are taken into account, not the 
underlying communications infrastructure. Communication is from phone to phone or from fax-machine to 
fax-machine. 
Most electronic communications, however, rely on the client-server architecture.97 In the case of 
email, there are at least two originating devices (the sender’s mail-client and the outgoing mail-server) 
and two terminating devices (the addressee’s incoming mail-server and the mail-client). Is it the mail-
client or the mail-server that should be taken into account? The decision has important implications for the 
time of contract formation, as there may be substantial delays between the moment a message arrives at 
the server and the moment it is transferred to the client. This is so despite the fact that the transmission 
process itself might be regarded as instantaneous. Accordingly, the precise time of formation depends on 
whether it is the server or the client that is selected as the relevant device.  
To complicate matters, electronic communications involve multiple intermediaries. Some of them 
form part of the transmission channel, others can be regarded as belonging to the respective spheres of 
control of the sender or the addressee. Telecommunication carriers and the post are traditionally regarded 
as independent third parties, which constitute part of the communications infrastructure. The position of 
Internet Service providers (ISPs), which provide some of the infrastructure used by the contracting parties, 
is difficult to evaluate. It is equally difficult to decide whether a particular device should be regarded as an 
originating/terminating device or as part of the transmission infrastructure.  
 
NOVEL RISKS 
Electronic communications introduce a number of novel risks. The Internet is not like the post or the 
telephone. Despite its ubiquity, it does not (yet) have the uniformity of one global system. The Internet is 
heterogeneous - each of its component networks retains some individual characteristics.98 Routing from 
one network to another may involve a conversion between the ‘idiosyncrasies of the two original 
networks’99 and require the trans-coding, translation or reformatting of messages. Each of these 
operations aims to adapt the message to the requirements of the next step in the transmission. Such 
conversions are, however, not always successful. As a result, there are many reasons an email may not be 
delivered or be delivered in unreadable form.100 Some risks have equivalents in traditional communications 
and are comparable to technical failures or bad maintenance.  Others are novel. It is difficult, for example, 
to find paper-based analogies for ‘wrong protocol version’ or ‘failure in trans-coding.’  
Each of the risks, both old and new, must be allocated to one of the contracting parties. Some 
broad assumptions must be made: there are only two possible risk-bearers, the sender and the addressee. 
Intuitively, risks relating to dispatch should be borne by the sender, risks relating to receipt - by the 
addressee. At a more detailed level: (a) risks that can be prevented or mitigated by a party should be borne 
by that party, for example, each party should be responsible for the part of the infrastructure it owns or 
                                                
97 The Internet provides a general-purpose infrastructure that permits applications on an arbitrary pair of computers 
to exchange information. One application must initiate this process, whereas the other must accept it. This is the 
so-called ‘client-server paradigm’ of interaction. The application that actively initiates contact and requests a 
particular service or resource is called client, the application passively awaiting such requests and providing 
services or resources on demand is called server. In general, clients reside locally on the user’s computer and are 
directly invoked by such user, whereas servers run on more powerful remote computers. Information may pass in 
either or both directions. The terms ‘client’ and ‘server’ refer to applications or processes but are often used in 
relation to the computers that run those processes. For a detailed description see: D E Comer, Computer Networks 
and Internets with Internet Applications, 4th ed, New Jersey 2004, p 422 
98 RFC 1122, Requirements for Internet Hosts – Communication Layers, R Braden, ed, (1989) 
99 G Brookshear, Computer Science, An Overview, Boston 2004  p 138 
100 For a detailed description see: RFC 3463 ‘Enhanced Mail System Status Codes’ (2003) G Vaudreuil 
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controls; (b) intermediaries who remain in a contractual relationship with one of the parties should belong 
to this party’s sphere of control, i.e. the risks inherent in their operation should be borne by this party; (c) 
the earlier the risk is transferred from the sender, the sooner it is borne by the addressee.  
With this in mind, the solutions in the ETA and the CUECIC must be examined.   
 
D ispatch 
According to ETA Section 13 (1) dispatch occurs when a message ‘enters a single information system 
outside the control of the originator.’ According to section 13 (2) if a message ‘enters successively two or 
more information systems outside the control of the originator,’ dispatch occurs ‘when it enters the first of 
those information systems.’  
The first key element in the above formula is ‘Information system.’ The latter is defined as ‘a 
system for generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing data messages.’101 It is unclear 
whether ‘information system’ refers to clients, servers or the whole network.102 By definition, messages 
travelling over the Internet pass through multiple information systems. ETA does not explain the 
relationship between these successive systems. Similarly, the concept of single information system does 
not facilitate the distinction between mail-clients and mail-servers, or between mail-servers and the 
transmission environment.  
The second key element is ‘control.’ Dispatch occurs when the sender loses control of the 
message. As with ‘information system,’ it is difficult to ascertain when such loss of control occurs. 
Needless to say, this moment is strictly related to which part of the communication infrastructure is 
regarded as being under the sender’s control. The mail-client is on the sender’s computer and therefore 
under his or her control.103 Mail-servers, however, are generally provided and operated by ISPs. In those 
instances where senders do not operate their own mail-servers and choose an ISP to provide this service, 
the dispatch of the message from the mail-client could be intuitively associated with ‘loss of control.’   
Accordingly, the moment of dispatch would depend on who controls the mail-server. This in turn raises a 
general question about the role of ISP - or intermediaries in general. Some intermediaries are chosen by 
the parties, others are implicit in the functioning of the communications infrastructure. Are ISPs like the 
post and mail-servers like mailboxes? It must be recalled that in those instances when the postal 
acceptance rule applies, the sender’s risk ceases and ‘transmission’ commences when letters are placed 
in the mailbox. The mailbox constitutes part of the postal system. The latter is not considered as an agent 
of either the sender or the addressee but an independent third party.104  
Mail-servers, however, are not mailboxes and ISPs are not independent third parties. ISPs are 
chosen by and remain in contractual relationships with senders, providing their part of the communication 
infrastructure. Although senders have no technical control over mail-servers, they must be taken to 
assume the risks of their operation (i.e. uptime, configuration, frequency of dispatch). After all, if ‘dispatch’ 
depended on the actual control of the mail-server and the outgoing ISP was not regarded as acting on the 
sender’s behalf, the risks of operation of the sender’s mail-server would be borne by the addressee. This in 
turn, would render the latter liable for any shortcomings in the sender’s choice of ISP. It must also be 
remembered that technically, there is nothing preventing the sender from operating his or her own mail-
server. In other words, the ISP is only providing a service that the sender could be undertaking him or 
herself. Only if Internet connectivity and mail-servers were provided exclusively by a single, universal 
telecommunications provider, such ‘ISP’ would bear more similarity to the post and the mail-server could 
                                                
101 ETA Section 5 
102 See: P Knight, The Electronic Transactions Bill 1999 (2000) 6 CTLR 105 at 110 
103 For the sake of simplicity we disregard whether the sender uses a shared computer, e.g. in an Internet café. It is 
also irrelevant whether the mail-client takes the form of a browser, as in the case of web-mail, or a dedicated 
email application, such as Outlook. 
104 P Fasciano, Internet Electronic Mail: A Last Bastion for the Mailbox Rule, (1997) 25 Hofstra Law Rev 971 at 995; 
see also: S Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, 4th ed, vol 2, 1991 para 6:37 
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be regarded as part of the transmission infrastructure. Leaving the mail-client would be synonymous with 
loss of control, similar to placing a letter into a mailbox.  
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Electronic Transactions Bill 1999 associates dispatch with 
the beginning of the electronic communication.105 It also states that dispatch occurs when the message 
‘enters the originator’s Internet service provider’s system.’106 This implies that in its current wording the 
ETA regards the sender’s outgoing mail-server as remaining outside his or her control and associates the 
commencement of transmission with dispatch from the sender’s mail-client. This approach, however, is 
inconsistent with the technical functioning of email: transmission commences when the outgoing mail-
server introduces the message into the transport environment.107 Most importantly, this proposition 
disregards the fact that the ISP has been chosen by the sender and does not constitute part of the general 
transmission infrastructure. The outgoing mail-server cannot be equated with a mailbox in the street. 
The CUECIC replaces ‘entry’ with ‘leave.’108 As the definition of ‘information system’ is identical to the one 
in the ETA,109 it remains unclear whether messages must leave the mail-client or the mail-server.110 The 
proposed amendment must be praised for abandoning the unnecessary distinction between first and 
second information system. Neither the CUECIC itself nor its explanatory notes, however, deal with the 
role of ISPs. Quite the opposite: the explanatory notes emphasize that the Convention does not deal with 
intermediaries.111 As a result, the proposed ‘update’ does not clarify the most important issue: when does 
loss of control occur? 
 
Receipt  
ETA Section 13 (3) states that in the case of designated information systems, receipt occurs upon entry. If 
no system was designated, receipt occurs when the message comes to the addressee’s attention.  
The term ‘information system’ plays a crucial role again. As in the case of dispatch, it is not clear whether 
a message should enter the addressee’s mail-server or mail-client. Given the breadth of the definition of 
‘information system,’ entry could relate to a whole network or to one machine. A broad meaning implies 
an early cessation of the risks borne by the sender. To illustrate the point: if ‘information system’ means 
‘network,’ entry occurs when a message enters any first point considered as belonging to the network.112 
Once inside, the sender would not bear the risks of any occurrences within the network, including 
protective measures placed before the mail-server (for example, spam filters). A narrower meaning, 
however, exposes the sender to the risks occurring within the network – until a specific machine or point 
in the network is reached.  
The moment of receipt also depends on whether a message is sent to a designated or non-
designated information system. The ETA Explanatory Memorandum presumes that designated systems are 
regularly checked for messages.113 Absent designation receipt is tied exclusively to a subjective event – 
coming to the addressee’s attention.114 Accordingly, senders bear the risks inherent in the delay between 
the moment the message enters an information system and the moment it comes to the addressee’s 
attention. The length of time during which the message remains on the mail-server (assuming for a 
                                                
105 Electronic Transactions Bill 1999, Explanatory Memorandum p 12 
106 Electronic Transactions Bill 1999, Explanatory Memorandum p 12 
107 RFC 2821, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, J Klensin, ed, (2001) p 11 
108 CUECIC Art 10.1 
109 CUECIC Art 4 (g) compared to ETA Section 5 
110 A/CN.9/528 para 149: The preparatory works elaborate that information systems must be distinguished from 
‘information service providers or telecommunication carriers that might offer intermediary services or technical 
support infrastructure for the exchange of data messages.’ 
111 CUECIC Art 4 (d), (e); EN 99, p 39 
112 The choice of computer network device would also depend on which layer of the TCP/IP protocol is examined. 
113 Electronic Transactions Bill 1999, Explanatory Memorandum p 12 
114 Electronic Transactions Bill 1999, Explanatory Memorandum p 12 
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moment that the mail-server is the information system) may be significant. During this period, the offer 
may still be withdrawn even if the acceptance is already within the addressee’s sphere of control. 
Moreover, if the mail-server crashes due to a fault of the addressee (for example, due to bad 
maintenance), no receipt occurs. This constitutes an alteration of the traditional principles, where the 
malfunctioning of the terminating device due to the addressee’s fault does not preclude receipt.115 
Moreover, traditional principles disregard any subjective elements on the addressee’s side. Receipt is tied 
to an objectively ascertainable event – not to the addressee’s state of mind.  
According to CUECIC Art 10.2, receipt occurs when messages become ‘capable of being retrieved 
by the addressee at an electronic address designated by the addressee.’ Receipt at a non-designated 
address occurs when messages become ‘capable of being retrieved by the addressee at that address and 
the addressee becomes aware that the message has been sent to that address.’  
The CUECIC replaces ‘information system’ with ‘electronic address,’ remedying the difficulties 
implied by its broad definition. ‘Electronic address’ has a narrow meaning and points to a specific part of 
an information system: the storage area on a mail-server.116 The CUECIC also replaces the term ‘entry’ with 
‘becoming retrievable.’ This replacement supports the view that the relevant terminating device is the 
mail-server: it is the mail-server from which messages are being retrieved.  
In the case of non-designated addresses, the objective component (capability of being retrieved) 
is supplemented by a subjective element (awareness). It is unclear why awareness relates to the 
message’s dispatch, not receipt. It can be assumed that once the addressee knows that a message has 
been sent, he or she must monitor the relevant account for incoming communications – even if such 
account is not designated. ‘Awareness,’ however, raises problems of proof.117  Surprisingly, ‘awareness’ 
was considered more ‘equitable than holding the addressee bound by a message sent to an information 
system that the addressee could not reasonably expect would be used in the context of its dealings with 
the originator or for the purpose for which the data message had been sent.’118 At the same time it was 
admitted that ‘awareness’ gives power to the addressee to effect receipt and places a heavy evidential 
burden on senders.119 Considering the vagueness of ‘designation,’ (see below) in many instances receipt 
could exclusively depend on ‘awareness.’ This would constitute a significant alteration of the traditional 
principles which regard ‘receipt’ as an objective event, unrelated to any subjective occurrences on the 
addressee’s side.  
To complicate matters further, messages are presumed to be capable of being retrieved when 
they reach the addressee’s electronic address.120 It is interesting to note that, technically, the ‘capability of 
being retrieved’ points to a later stage in the transmission process than the original term used in the 
MLEC, ‘entry.’ Messages must first ‘enter’ an information system, or electronic address, before becoming 
‘retrievable.’ The presumption, however, associates ‘retrievability’ with an event that precedes ‘entry.’ The 
CUECIC disregards the fact that messages may reach an electronic address or particular network but be 
rejected by a protective measure, therefore never becoming retrievable.  After all, spam filters, firewalls 
                                                
115 Carter on Contract [03-410] 
116 Electronic addresses generally refer to accounts on mail-servers. One mail-server can host multiple accounts. 
Multiple mail-servers may be part of the same information system. This can be explained by looking at the structure 
of an email address. The latter consists of a character string identifying the individual account, the symbol @ and the 
name of the mail-server that should receive the message. The name of the mail-server is specific to the domain in 
which it is located, i.e. the network to which the server belongs. The second part of an email address could be 
regarded as pointing to an information system, whereas the first part as indicting an individual account. See 
Brookshear at note 100 at 141-142 
117 A/60/17 para 82 During the preparatory works it was admitted that the provision created legal uncertainty as 
‘awareness’ is a subjective circumstance not easily proven by the sender. It was held, however, that awareness 
‘could be proven by other objective evidence’. 
118 A/CN.9/528 para 143 
119 A/CN.9/528 para 144 
120 CUECIC Art 10, see also CISG Art 18 
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and anti-virus software, operate on various points in the network.121 Depending on the circumstances, 
messages may be precluded from entering the mail-server, the mail-client or the network.  On one hand, 
according to the presumption, ‘receipt’ would occur despite such rejection – as long as the message 
reaches an address of information system.122  On the other, a literal reading of Art 10, suggests that 
‘receipt’ does not occur as the message does not become retrievable. In other words, the ‘capability of 
being retrieved’ may not be the effected by the message reaching an electronic address. 
Additional problems are created by the term ‘designation.’ The practical implications of 
designating an address are far-reaching. There may be a significant delay between a message becoming 
retrievable and the moment an addressee becomes aware of its existence. ‘Designation’ can therefore 
make or break a contract. Despite its significance, however, ‘designation’ remains undefined.123 The MLEC 
guide to enactment explicitly states that the mere indication of an email or telecopy address on a 
letterhead does not constitute designation.124 One must ask: what does?  
Problems of ‘designation’ do not arise in postal communications: there is usually one address per 
entity and a direct correlation between ‘address’ and ‘mailbox.’ Unquestionably, in larger companies each 
department or branch may have its own, physical mailbox. There is no division, however, into designated 
and non-designated mailboxes. If an address is made public as the address of a company or person, all 
letters sent to it are effective - unless specifically indicated otherwise in the offer. Distribution to the 
respective persons and departments is handled internally. ‘Designation’ obligates senders to investigate 
the correct address without imposing an equivalent obligation on addressees to clearly designate their 
systems. If a system is held out to receive communications, its designation should be implied. This would 
mirror the traditional rules of receipt. Under the regime created by the ETA and the CUECIC receipt may 
not occur even if an information system is held out – as long as it is not expressly designated. If addresses 
of particular information systems or accounts are disseminated or made public, addressees should not be 
permitted to claim that such systems or accounts are not designated. 125 How does designation occur 
absent a specific provision in the offer or prior communications, if not by providing an address or number? 
It appears questionable whether the development of special addressing rules facilitates on-line 
contracting.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the ETA, not nor the CUECIC provide clarity or certainty in the field of on-line contract formation. 
Quite the opposite: CUECIC introduces further complications in an area, which is already blurred by the 
ETA. Both the ETA and the CUECIC illustrate the difficulties of creating universal and easily applicable 
solutions to the problems created by the use of modern communication methods in the formation of 
contracts. Even small inconsistencies in the formulation of a provision can send ripple effects across the 
well-established regime of contract formation principles. Their effect can be best described as 
interference – if not confusion. 
The rule that intention may be manifested in any manner holds true both in the real world and on-
line. The legal effect of a statement depends on the intention of its maker – not on the method of 
                                                
121 C Hunt, TCP/IP Network Administration, 2nd ed, Sebastopol 1997, Chapter 12  
122 A/CN.9/528 para 80, concerns were expressed over technologies restricting receipt. For general discussion see: 
Ch H Martin, The UNCITRAL Electronic Contracts Convention: Will it be Used or Avoided? (2005) 17 Pace Int’l L Rev 
261 at 294 
123 It was stated difficulties in applying Section 15 cannot be overcome by defining ‘designated information system. 
A/CN.9/528 para 148, see also EN [187] p 63 
124 MLEC Guide to Enactment para 103  
125 See: D Giles, You’ve Got Mail….or Have You? (2000) 3 Internet Law Bulletin 12 at 14, who suggests that to avoid 
the consequences of designation people may use disclosures like ‘nothing in this email constitutes designation for 
the purposes of….’ See also: Carter on Contract [03-430], where it is assumed that the designation of an 
information system is synonymous with the provision of an email address. 
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manifestation. For those seeking comfort in regulations, a mere declaration to the effect that electronic 
contracting is legally admissible should suffice. One must ask: is it worthwhile confirming that something 
is possible if such possibility clearly derives from the basic principles of contract law? 
It is unquestionably more difficult to apply the offer acceptance model to websites and clicks, 
than it is to a formalized exchange of paper documents. It is also more difficult to examine the time of 
formation in relation to communications based on the client-and-server paradigm. The latter renders it 
difficult to apply principles, which developed around postal communications. These difficulties do not 
imply, however, that a change in the legal principle or a regulation of contract law is necessary.  
The validation of automated transaction is not necessary, the creation of a presumption that 
websites constitute invitations to treat is theoretically incorrect. The recommendation dealing with input 
errors recognize the cognitive difficulties of web-based transactions but fail to follow through with a 
theoretically correct solution thereby creating opportunities for abuse.  
A closer look at the solutions proposed by the CUECIC and the ETA in relation to ‘dispatch’ and 
‘receipt’ reveals their inability to deal with even the most basic communication scenarios. They seem to 
favor a principle based on the actual control of the communication infrastructure. Their verbatim reading 
implies that it is the mail-client that must be taken into account when determining the moment of 
dispatch. At the same time, ‘receipt’ is associated with ‘availability,’ which in turn points to the 
addressee’s mail-server. Consequently, the mail-server is separated from the mail-client in the case of 
dispatch but treated as one device for the purposes of receipt: dispatch occurs when a message leaves the 
mail-client but is received when it reaches, or enters, the mail-server.  
The role of ISPs is difficult to ascertain. The ETA and the CUECIC seem to treat ISPs like the post, 
i.e. as part of the transmission infrastructure. It is forgotten that – unlike the post – the sender may run his 
own mail-server and also has a choice in the selection of ISPs. It remains unclear whether the mail-server 
is regarded as part of the transmission channel or as a terminating or originating device. A technically 
correct approach would treat mail-clients and mail-servers are one device, i.e. disregard message 
transfers between mail-clients and mail-servers.  
The combined effect of the suggested amendment creates a separate regime for contracts 
formed by electronic means. It is debatable whether such duality promotes certainty and predictability. 
Contract law can absorb technological change126 without the need for special rules, presumptions or 
parallel regimes.   
 
                                                
126 L Lessig, Code and other Laws of Cyberspace, New York 1999, p 78, 79; Y Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock 
and Looking Forward (2000) 71 U Colo L Rev 1203. 
